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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the thesis (recently pointed out by empirical evidence on Swiss 
data) that, if temporary contracts are utilised by firms as a tool to screen potential new 
employees and provide workers with a “stepping stone” into permanent employment, 
then temporary employees have an incentive to provide more effort than their 
permanent colleagues. 
After a theoretical discussion,  the paper focuses on the econometrical analysis of this 
thesis in an institutional context, like the Italian one, in which permanent workers are 
rather protected and firms are likely to use temporary contracts mainly to adjust the 
workforce during the cycle. Data are drawn from ECHP (1996-2001) for Italy and from 
ISFOL-Plus 2005. 
The paper concludes by pointing out that a higher effort does not necessary mean higher 
labour productivity, and suggests the necessary public policies to improve productivity 
in labour markets characterised  by a  growing rate of temporary jobs.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper links up to the wide literature investigating the incentive effects of 
contracts and, more generally, employment protection. In particular, I refer to 
studies evaluating the contract and employment protection effects on the 
employees’ effort. This literature originated from some papers based on the 
hypothesis that sick-pay would provide incentives for opportunistic behaviour. In 
this framework Barmby et al. (1991),  Johannson and Palme (1996, 2002), and 
Barmby (2002) find a decline in absenteeism after a reduction of sick-pay. Other 
studies find a strong increase in absenteeism among Italian (Ichino and Riphahn, 
2005) and German (Riphahn and Thalmaier, 2001, Ichino and Riphahn, 2004) 
employees after the end of the probation period. Jimeno and Cortés (1996) find 
similar results by investigating the effect of low employment protection on 
absenteeism in Spanish temporary contracts1.  
On the contrary, although temporary contracts are considered less expensive 
because they avoid inflexibility costs (Bentolila, Bertola, 1990;  Bentolila, Saint 
Paul, 1994; Saint Paul, 2004), some authors have underlined the disadvantages of 
creating temporary jobs, and the lack of career opportunities attached to them, 
(Farber, 1999; Arulampalon, Booth, 1998), because they imply a  lower effort and 
lower loyalty on behalf of the workers. 
In a recent paper Engellandt and Riphahn (2005), having considered two 
different effort indicators (unpaid overtime hours and absenteeism for illness and 
family reasons) taken from the Swiss Labour Force Survey, indicate that temporary 
employees display higher levels of effort than their permanent colleagues. 
The authors point out that in Switzerland, like in the UK and in the USA, 
employment protection for permanent contracts is rather limited. For this reason it 
might be less likely in Switzerland, compared to other European countries, that 
temporary contracts are used to avoid regulation and/or as a buffer against cyclical 
fluctuations by employers. Then temporary contracts would be used by the firm 
mainly as a tool to screen the potential workforce and they are likely to provide a 
“stepping stone” to move into permanent employment. In this case temporary 
employment can offer access to desirable permanent contracts and temporary 
employees have an incentive to provide higher levels of effort. Indeed, the 
hypothesis that temporary workers are likely to provide more effort than permanent 
ones if temporary employment guarantees a good probability of moving on to 
permanent contracts, is considered in Engellandt and Riphahn’s paper, even if it is 
not submitted to econometric tests. 
In this theoretical framework, this paper intends to investigate the Italian 
experience, in order to identify the differences in comparison with Swiss and 
Anglo-Saxon ones.   
In particular I intend to investigate the relationship between temporary workers’ 
effort and the individual’s subjective expectation of converting a current temporary 
job in a stable one, in the Italian institutional context, in which permanent workers 
(“lavoratori a tempo indeterminato”) are highly protected by law and by collective 
agreements (Booth, Doledo, Frank, 2002) and firms would use temporary contracts 
                                                 
1 . It is worth noting that, from a different point of  view, Guadalupe (2003) shows that temporary 
contracts cause significantly higher accident rates. 
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mainly to adjust the workforce during  business cycle phases (Barbieri, Sestito, 
2004). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical bases of 
the relationship among temporary workers’ effort and the probability of getting a 
permanent contract; section 3 is devoted to the econometric analysis of such an 
hypothesis; section 4 points out that a higher effort does not necessarily mean 
higher productivity. Some concluding remarks and policy implications will follow. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
 
A variety of theoretical debates are based on the assumption that workers’ effort 
depends on “motivation” (Ferguson, 2004; Green, Mclntosh, 1998).  Support for 
this approach may be also found in the theories on dual labour markets (Doeringer, 
Piore, 1985; Dickens, Lang, 1985). Such theories sought to distinguish primary 
labour market, which concerns essentially “permanent” labour contracts, from 
secondary labour market, which concerns essentially “temporary” contracts. In this 
case, primary sector jobs would be more “worker friendly”, in the sense that they 
would be more likely to use the “carrot” of high wages than the “stick” of the 
implicit dismissal threats, embodied in (high levels of monitoring and) temporary 
contracts. Moreover, under the hypothesis of effort-based career opportunity, 
Bratti and  Staffolani (2004) show that firms’ personnel management policies can 
use effort-based promotion schemes to raise working time. 
Generally speaking we could say that workers would perform a higher effort to 
improve the “quality” of their jobs. The issue is to define the “quality of job”. 
Even if this definition has been subject to an increasing debate in Europe2, the 
dimension of “precariousness versus stability” is considered of fundamental 
importance to measure the quality of a job. In particular, precariousness is the first 
indicator  of jobs quality (out of 11) proposed by the European  Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Dhondt, Houtmann, 1997). 
The current approach of “job satisfaction economics” (Freeman, 2006)  also 
emphasizes the importance of job security among the working conditions assessing 
overall job satisfaction.  In this theoretical framework, the shifts of the 
occupational structure may alter job satisfaction and, as a consequence, may alter 
the motivation and the effort of certain groups of workers who risk to remain 
precarious employees. 
On the other hand, Rodgers (1989) pointed out that precariousness is not only 
connected to atypical work, but it is measured through four dimensions: 
1. security (continuity of employment – in this light, short/fixed time work is 
considered precarious); 
2. working conditions (such as income and working time); 
3. protection (such as protection against discrimination and unfair dismissal, 
but also in the sense of social protection connected to social security 
benefits); 
4. economic vulnerability due to low income jobs. 
                                                 
2 . “Jobs quality” is one of the priorities of the European Employment Strategies. Indeed, the 
European Commission, in the approach presented by Lisbon Council in 1999, emphasises two 
aims of social policies: the creation of  “more and better jobs”. 
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In any case, most Italian temporary/atypical contracts are characterised by 
worse working conditions/lower income than permanent ones, and they often do 
not provide employment protection in case of illness, maternity, etc.. In this case 
precariousness would coincide with atypical work and  it seems possible to 
conclude that  “improving the quality of one’s own job” (the “promotion scheme”) 
means, for an Italian temporary worker, getting a permanent job. 
Indeed, some researches on precarious employment in Europe (see, for 
example, the results of the comparative international research ESOPE (Frey, Croce, 
eds., 2002), suggest that the possible higher effort of precarious and temporary 
workers would be performed to improve monetary and non-monetary working 
conditions, with special references to transforming temporary work into permanent 
work within a reasonable period of time.  
Coherently with these results, early studies about temporary contracts have been 
analysed by Booth et al. (2002), who assert that temporary workers’ effort depends 
on the probability of career advancement, measured by the probability of moving 
on to a permanent contract. More recently Bradley et al., 2007, in a empirical study 
on a sample of Australian public sector workers, highlighted that the risk of job 
loss and the possibility of getting a permanent contract have significant and 
separate effects on temporary workers absenteeism. 
Following all these results, in my analysis, I focus on the issue that temporary 
employees’ effort depends on the probability of gaining permanency, rather than 
the fear of dismissal per se.  
This hypothesis agrees with Engellandt and Riphahn’s point of view, but with 
some relevant differences.  
First of all, Swiss and Anglo-Saxon empirical studies confirm that temporary 
contracts are used as a “stepping stone” towards permanent contracts, whereas 
Italian empirical studies can not confirm this. In Italy, the probability of using 
temporary contracts as a “stepping stone” is low and depends on the allocation of 
the job, the firm’s size, the position held, the labour markets’ conditions at local 
level and the worker’s characteristics (Ghignoni, 2007).  
Secondly, given that most Italian temporary contracts do not provide social 
protection, whereas permanent jobs are quite protected (Booth, Doledo, Frank, 
2002), employers would use these contracts mainly to adjust the workforce during 
the business cycle (Barbieri, Sestito, 2004)  and they are often being renewed. This 
highlights further differences between Italy and Switzerland, or Anglo-Saxon 
countries, where permanent employment protection is, in general, limited and 
employers are not stimulated to substitute permanent contracts with temporary 
ones. 
For both reasons, we can not state, as Engellandt and Riphahn (op. cit.), that 
workers on temporary contracts have an incentive to provide more effort than 
permanent colleagues, because they perceive temporary contracts as a tool to 
screen new permanent employees. On the contrary, we have to hypothesize, and 
test on empirical data, that temporary workers provide more effort if  (and only if) 
they perceive a good probability of getting a stable contract. 
The empirical analysis carried out in this paper, emphasising the assumption 
that employees give priority to job security, focuses on the following hypotheses: 
1. workers’ power bargaining is weaker than the employers’ one (because of the 
existence of unemployment).  
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2. Temporary workers are interested in being employed by the same firm with a 
permanent contract, in order to reduce mobility costs and to improve working 
conditions. For this reason temporary workers show a higher level of effort.  
3. Workers are able to balance personal characteristics, working conditions and 
labour market facets to come up with an overall assessment of the probability 
of moving into permanent labour contracts. In this case, temporary workers 
show different levels of effort, depending on local labour markets’ conditions, 
firm size, education, age, gender and other workers’ individual characteristics. 
 
3. The empirical analysis 
 
To test the hypotheses that a high level of effort among temporary workers is 
positively correlated with the probability of moving on to a permanent contract, in 
the Italian experience, we dispose of two main sources of data: (1) the European 
Community Household Panel (EUROSTAT, 1996-2001), and (2) the ISFOL-Plus 
survey carried out in 2005. 
In particular, the latter survey, allows utilizing information about the 
individual’s subjective expectation of converting a temporary job into a permanent 
one. In the absence of such an information (like in ECHP data), I hypothesize that 
the subjective perception of the probability of moving towards a permanent 
contract is represented by some probability indicators related to the macro-area 
where the workplace is located.  
 
 
3.1 The empirical analysis on ECHP data 
 
The European Community Household Panel is essentially a household 
longitudinal survey, based on a set of questions concerning individual job 
characteristics and work experience. The model analyses 6 waves of the ECHP 
dataset, carried out between 1996 and 20013.  
The ECHP questionnaire does not include direct questions on effort (as, i.e.,  
“Do you provide paid or unpaid overtime work?”). Alternatively, we have 
information on real working hours (“Total numbers of hours working per week”) 
that we can compare with hypothetical bargained working hours, that is, 40 hours a 
week (for full time contracts) or 20 hours a week (for part time contracts).  
This way I use the (probability of) “overtime work”, that is whether the 
individual works longer hours than spelled out in a given contract (40 hours if the 
individual has a full time contract and 20 hours if he has a part time contract), as an 
effort indicator. 
Firstly, I am concerned with whether (or not) the working hours are longer 
than the contracted ones, especially for temporary workers. 
Secondly, I want to explore how the effort differs for groups of workers, 
defined by personal individual characteristics (such as gender, education, age and 
specific work experience) and by local labour markets’ characteristics. In 
                                                 
3 . Due to the absence of PE0024 question (about the type of contract) in the first wave (1994), and to 
the lack of reliable data on the percentage of temporary contracts by gender and region in 1994 
and 1995, I had to exclude these waves from the sample. 
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particular, I focus on the subjective probability perceived by temporary workers to 
move to permanent labour contracts. 
The simple probability of overtime by type of contract and gender is reported in 
table 1. The aggregated results confirm the expectation of a higher effort among 
temporary workers (especially if they do not have a regular contract). On the other 
hand, men generally seem to provide a higher level of effort than women, no matter 
the type of contract4. 
To perform a deeper analysis I could estimate the following simple probit 
model: 
 
iii XP εβα ++=       where:          =iP   ∫    workovertime  of  case  in  1 otherwise   0                      [1] 
 
where the set of independent variables X describes personal and socio-economic 
characteristics of the individuals, and the situation of local labour markets. 
However the correlation between hours worked and temporary contracts may be 
influenced by some unobservable individual characteristics, simultaneously 
determining working time and the type of contract. In order to mitigate the problem 
of unobservable heterogeneity I use panel data methods.  
 
 
 
Table 1 - Overtime work by type of contract and gender (%) 
Type of temporary contract Overtime work 
 
 
Permanent contract
 
 
Temporary 
contract 
 
 
fixed/short 
term contract
casual work
 
Other 
arrangement 
Total 
 
Males and females
No 43.09 40.08 42.49 34.94 38.78 42.69 
Yes 56.91 59.92 57.51 65.06 61.22 57.31 
Pearson chi2(3) =  28.8973   Pr. = 0.000*
Males
No 35.61 32.44 35.66 25.43 31.92 35.22 
Yes 64.39 67.56 64.34 74.57 68.08 64.78 
Pearson chi2(3) =  27.0866   Pr. = 0.000*
Females
No 54.82 49.91 51.10 49.87 45.82 54.10 
Yes 45.18 50.09 48.90 50.13 54.18 45.90 
Pearson chi2(3) =  16.8178   Pr. = 0.001*
Pearson chi2 between  “permanent contract” and   different types of  “temporary contracts” 
Source: elaborations on Eurostat data 
 
In this context unobserved heterogeneity across individuals may be accounted 
for by directly modelling it as a random or fixed effect. In any case, if I used fixed 
effect models it would be necessary to use only the observation for which the value 
of the dummy iP   in equation [1] changes over time (“movers”). In this case I 
would exclude from the analysis those individuals who never worked overtime and 
                                                 
4 . Coherently with Engellandt and Riphahn (2004), women (on temporary or permanent employment) 
ceteris paribus may provide less effort than men, since men are more likely to seek a career 
advancement. 
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those who always did. For this reason I prefer to estimate the following random 
effect probit model: 
 
iiti XDP εβδα +++=       where:      =iP   ∫    workovertime  of  case  in  1 otherwise   0              [2] 
 
in which the independent variables include, among others, a set of yearly 
dummy variables. 
Estimations are performed on a sample including all the individuals in the 
ECHP waves from 3 to 8 (years 1996-2001) who work with a permanent contract, 
a temporary contract or a precarious5 contract.  
 
Table 2 -  Random effect probit model: permanent and temporary workers 
 
Random-effects GLS regression    
Number of obs = 7679 
Group variable (i): pid                     
Number of groups = 2855 
                         
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian     
Corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)            
R-sq:  within  = 0.0251                 
       between = 0.4017                    
       overall = 0.3677        
Obs per group: min = 1 
avg = 2.7 
max = 6 
 
 
Wald chi2(24) = 2087.15 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| 
1997 0.00565 0.013823 0.41 0.683 
1998 -0.0392 0.013952 -2.81 0.005 
1999 -0.02651 0.014325 -1.85 0.064 
2000 -0.02041 0.014703 -1.39 0.165 
2001 -0.00901 0.015139 -0.6 0.552 
Age -0.01225 0.006355 -1.93 0.054 
Age squared 0.000126 7.59E-05 1.66 0.098 
Females -0.1916 0.014397 -13.31 0.000 
Married 0.012735 0.02075 0.61 0.539 
South -0.11125 0.014047 -7.92 0.000 
Bad Health -0.01771 0.02782 -0.64 0.524 
Secondary Education -0.05685 0.020381 -2.79 0.005 
Tertiary Education -0.00357 0.022835 -0.16 0.876 
Small and medium firm -0.00416 0.011549 -0.36 0.719 
Specific Experience 0.000917 0.001042 0.88 0.379 
Manufacturing Industries 0.146631 0.01478 9.92 0.000 
Elementary occupations -0.06235 0.018281 -3.41 0.001 
Public sector -0.28977 0.014328 -20.22 0.000 
Not overskilled 0.016715 0.010042 1.66 0.096 
Not specific training -0.017 0.010673 -1.59 0.111 
Satisfied about working hours -0.07106 0.009921 -7.16 0.000 
Hours spent for children care -7.1E-05 0.000309 -0.23 0.818 
Log(hourly wage) -0.59815 0.043319 -13.81 0.000 
Temporary work 0.079415 0.021772 3.65 0.000 
Constant 1.758082 0.136852 12.85 0.000 
sigma_u   .28211721; sigma_e   .28174636; rho   .50065769   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
Source: elaborations on Eurostat data 
 
According to the results, reported in table 2, the probability of overtime work is 
significantly lower for females, for southern workers, for individuals with a 
secondary level of education (compared to those with a lower level of education), 
                                                 
5 . This means, in ECHP, PE024>1. I have 29,486 observations. For a description of data and 
variables, see Appendix A.  
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in the Public sector and for people involved in unskilled occupation. On the other 
hand, people involved in the manufacturing sector seem to have a higher 
probability of working longer hours than the contracted ones. Moreover the 
probability of overtime seems to decrease with higher hourly wages6.  
The yearly dummies, which should provide evidence of a higher or lower 
probability of overwork for each year with respect to 1996 (year of reference), do 
not show significant results except for 1998. In this year, the probability of 
overwork was significantly lower in comparison with 1996 (tables 2, 4 and 5). 
In any case, temporary workers show a higher probability of doing overtime 
work. Nevertheless, according to my hypotheses, temporary workers would be 
more available towards overtime work if they perceive that they have a good 
probability of entering permanent employment, possibly in the same firm.  
To test this hypothesis I re-estimate a random effect probit model on a sample 
of temporary workers only, including an indicator of the probability of getting a 
permanent contract between the regressors. I use as a proxi for this probability the 
percentage of temporary contracts by region, gender and period of time (table 3), 
assuming that the higher is this percentage, the lower would be the subjective 
probability of getting a stable job.  
 
Table 3 – Percentage of temporary contracts at regional level, Italy, 1996-
2001, 
Males
Eurostat  macro-areas 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Valle d’Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria (North West) 3.9% 4.0% 4.8% 5.5% 6.3% 5.6% 
Lombardia 4.0% 4.8% 4.9% 4.5% 5.4% 4.7% 
Trentino A.Adige, Veneto, Friuli V.Giulia (North East) 5.3% 5.2% 5.6% 7.0% 6.9% 6.1% 
Emilia Romagna 5.4% 6.2% 6.6% 6.6% 6.7% 8.1% 
Toscana, Umbria, Marche (Centre) 4.6% 5.2% 5.6% 6.1% 7.4% 6.7% 
Lazio 4.7% 4.8% 6.3% 7.5% 7.6% 7.3% 
Abruzzo, Molise 5.2% 6.4% 7.8% 8.0% 6.9% 7.2% 
Campania 8.4% 9.3% 10.2% 11.1% 11.0% 9.2% 
Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria (South) 11.4% 12.0% 12.9% 13.3% 14.5% 14.4% 
Sicilia 13.5% 13.4% 13.4% 16.4% 17.0% 17.5% 
Sardegna 10.4% 13.0% 14.6% 13.8% 14.9% 12.6% 
Females
Eurostat  macro-areas 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Valle d’Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria (North West) 6.1% 7.3% 7.9% 9.1% 9.8% 9.9% 
Lombardia 6.1% 6.7% 7.4% 8.0% 8.9% 8.5% 
Trentino A.Adige, Veneto, Friuli V.Giulia (North East) 9.6% 9.9% 9.6% 11.5% 11.3% 10.6% 
Emilia Romagna 8.9% 9.2% 9.7% 10.7% 11.2% 11.8% 
Toscana, Umbria, Marche (Centre) 7.9% 8.4% 9.6% 10.7% 11.6% 11.3% 
Lazio 6.9% 8.4% 9.1% 10.9% 11.9% 12.0% 
Abruzzo, Molise 7.9% 10.8% 11.1% 11.4% 11.7% 12.3% 
Campania 10.8% 10.9% 13.2% 14.9% 15.7% 14.7% 
Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria (South) 17.1% 16.9% 18.9% 19.7% 20.4% 18.7% 
Sicilia 13.5% 14.28% 16.9% 18.3% 18.6% 19.8% 
Sardegna 12.8% 12.6% 14.1% 18.2% 19.3% 19.1% 
Source: elaborations on Istat data 
 
With regard to this indicator, it is important to stress that I based my empirical 
analysis on a subjective probability and not necessary on an objective one. 
According to my hypothesis workers’ effort depends on the subjective perception 
                                                 
6 . Then, the “income effect” would overcome the “substitution effect”. 
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of improving personal working conditions, apart from the objective situation. The 
workers offer longer working hours because they convince themselves that they 
have a good probability of getting a permanent contract  in the same firm7. In this 
case, the evolution of the percentage of temporary contracts at local level is the 
most directly perceivable indicator of labour market conditions for the workers, 
rather than the temporary/permanent rate of transition8. The fact that the workers’ 
expectations may be incorrect, and that the real labour market conditions might be 
different from those subjectively perceived, is not important in this framework, at 
least in the short-run9. 
 
Table 4 -  Random effect probit model: temporary workers only 
 
Random-effects GLS regression      
Number of obs = 703 
Group variable (i): pid                   
Number of groups = 457 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian       
Corr(u_i, X)= 0 (assumed)               
R-sq:  within  = 0.0596                 
       between = 0.3059 
       overall = 0.3114        
Obs per group: min = 1 
avg = 1.5 
max = 6 
 
 
Wald chi2(25)= 224.2 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
1997 -0.03486 0.049694 -0.7 0.483 
1998 -0.05915 0.054196 -1.09 0.275 
1999 -0.08449 0.05684 -1.49 0.137 
2000 -0.01826 0.062892 -0.29 0.772 
2001 0.011227 0.058709 0.19 0.848 
Age 0.008143 0.017526 0.46 0.642 
Age squared -0.00012 0.000217 -0.56 0.573 
Females -0.16251 0.051466 -3.16 0.002 
Married -0.04584 0.056465 -0.81 0.417 
South 0.066461 0.066694 1 0.319 
Bad Health 0.046376 0.089265 0.52 0.603 
Secondary Education -0.00976 0.066997 -0.15 0.884 
Tertiary Education 0.057321 0.070794 0.81 0.418 
Small and medium firm 0.011166 0.042593 0.26 0.793 
Specific Experience -0.00016 0.003036 -0.05 0.959 
Manufacturing Industries 0.145284 0.059566 2.44 0.015 
Elementary occupations -0.09391 0.042617 -2.2 0.028 
Public sector -0.31107 0.044658 -6.97 0.000 
Not overskilled 0.047757 0.03473 1.38 0.169 
Not specific training 0.030436 0.044462 0.68 0.494 
Satisfied about working hours -0.06851 0.035432 -1.93 0.053 
Hours spent for children care 0.000577 0.001149 0.5 0.616 
log(hourly wage) -0.48646 0.115569 -4.21 0.000 
% of temporary contracts -0.021189 0.004571 -4.79 0.000 
number of periods of unemployment 0.00046 0.003124 0.15 0.883 
Constant 1.252509 0.368519 3.4 0.001 
sigma_u   .2830624; sigma_e   .31813554;  rho   .44185912   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
Source: elaborations on Eurostat data 
 
                                                 
7 . and because they “hope” that a higher effort may increase their probability of gaining permanency. 
8 . Then workers would perceive the “danger” of an increasing quota of temporary contracts 
before of obtaining reliable information about the conversion rate. 
9 . In the long-run, workers could learn from previous wrong expectations and they could base their 
future expectations on more refined indicators. 
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Note that, since the probability of overwork may be correlated with the 
percentage of temporary workers at local level in a specific period, in accordance 
with the economic cycle, the test could involve endogeneity problems. In periods 
of expansion, there could be, at the same time, a rise in overwork and a higher rate 
of temporary workers, whereas in periods of recession, there could be a reduction 
of both percentages. Then these two variables tend to be correlated and move in the 
same direction. For this reason, a yearly variable was included in the probit model 
to take into account the economic cycle of all six waves considered in the 
estimation, and in this should limit the problem of endogeneity. 
 
Table 5 -  Random effect probit model: the influence of the incidence of 
temporary contracts at local level 
 
Random-effects GLS regression      
Number of obs = 7679 
Group variable (i): pid                       
Number of groups   =  2855             
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian       
corr(u_i, X)  = 0 (assumed)              
R-sq:  within  = 0.0256                 
       between = 0.4015                 
       overall = 0.3666       
Obs per group: min = 1 
avg =       2.7 
max =  6 
 
 
Wald chi2(25)  =  2089.4 
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
1997 0.007796 0.013871 0.56 0.574 
1998 -0.03334 0.014328 -2.33 0.020 
1999 -0.01253 0.016319 -0.77 0.443 
2000 -0.00615 0.016727 -0.37 0.713 
2001 0.001998 0.016341 0.12 0.903 
Age -0.01257 0.006358 -1.98 0.048 
Age squared 0.000129 0.000076 1.7 0.088 
Females -0.17594 0.01687 -10.43 0.000 
Married 0.01247 0.020752 0.6 0.548 
South -0.08415 0.0207 -4.07 0.000 
Bad Health -0.01807 0.027817 -0.65 0.516 
Secondary Education -0.05676 0.020384 -2.78 0.005 
Tertiary Education -0.00323 0.022838 -0.14 0.887 
Small and medium firm -0.00372 0.011552 -0.32 0.747 
Specific Experience 0.000898 0.001042 0.86 0.389 
Manufacturing Industries 0.14587 0.014785 9.87 0.000 
Elementary occupations -0.06278 0.018281 -3.43 0.001 
Public sector -0.28831 0.014349 -20.09 0.000 
Not overskilled 0.017133 0.010044 1.71 0.088 
Not specific training -0.01715 0.010672 -1.61 0.108 
Satisfied about working hours -0.07068 0.009921 -7.12 0.000 
Hours spent for children care -7.9E-05 0.000309 -0.26 0.798 
log(hourly wage) -0.60066 0.043337 -13.86 0.000 
Temporary work 0.004084 0.017716 0.23 0.818 
% of temporary contracts -0.219455 0.004569 -4.80 0.000 
Constant 1.786634 0.137788 12.97 0.000 
sigma_u   .28224464; sigma_e   .28164951; rho   .50105541   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
Source: elaborations on Eurostat data 
 
To test, more generally, the influence of the overall individual’s working history 
on effort I also include in the regression the number of times the worker had been 
unemployed after 1989. 
The results of this second estimate are reported in table 4. 
When I include only temporary workers in the regression, the probability of 
overtime appears to be lower for female workers, for workers in elementary 
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occupations and in the Public sector, and higher in the manufacturing sector. This 
probability appears to be negatively correlated with hourly wages.  
According to my hypothesis the percentage of temporary contracts at the local 
level has a significantly negative impact on the probability of overtime, while the 
number of periods of unemployment does not seem to affect workers’ effort. It is 
worth noting that, when controlling for the incidence of temporary work at the 
local level, temporary southern workers do not exhibit a different probability of 
overwork compared to northern ones (table 4). 
To widen the results, I re-estimated the model using the overall sample (with 
both permanent and temporary workers), including among the regressors the 
incidence of temporary contracts at local level. In this case (table 5) the influence 
of the type of contract (temporary or permanent) on the probability of overtime is 
no longer significant. This could mean that, when controlling for the probability of 
transition from a temporary job to a permanent one, there would no longer be any 
significant difference between the effort behaviour of temporary workers and 
permanent ones. Then, after controlling  for the subjective probability of transition, 
temporary and permanent workers would present the same effort behaviour, even if 
these two categories of workers bear very different risks of job loss. In this case, 
the probability of gaining permanency would affect temporary workers effort more 
than fear of dismissal or non-renewal per se.  
 
3.2 The empirical analysis on ISFOL-PLUS  data 
 
The Isfol Participation Labour Unemployment Survey is a national sample 
survey on the individuals’ characteristics and the expectations of workers about 
their working life evolution. In particular, in this survey, various types of 
temporary workers10 are asked: “how do you feel about the probability of 
converting your present temporary job into a permanent one”?. For the purpose of 
this paper the ISFOL-Plus survey contains some useful information, such as: 
1. a series of effort indicators: 
- Do you do any paid or unpaid overtime work?  
- Do you do rotating shifts work?  
- Do you do night shifts (between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.)?  
- Do you work on statutory holidays and/or during the weekends?  
2. Some proxi variables for individual ability, which allow controlling for 
individual heterogeneity: 
- marks obtained in the different phases of the educational path; 
- regularity of the educational path (tertiary degree of education “in corso”,  
absence of failures during lower and upper secondary education). 
3. A subjective assessment of the probability of converting the actual temporary 
job into a permanent one, as specified above. 
In this case we could use some different effort indicators and estimate different 
probit models, as model [1], keeping into account the individual heterogeneity 
indicators and the subjective assessment of the probability of becoming a 
permanent worker. 
                                                 
10 . Workers on temporary contracts, Co-Co-Co, Co-Co-Pro, and interim workers. 
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Really, according to ISFOL-Plus data, temporary workers do not tent to be 
more inclined towards paid or unpaid overtime work than permanent ones (see 
table 6.a). Similarly, temporary workers would not be more available to work on 
the basis of rotating shifts or during nights (see tables 6.b, 6.c)  than permanent 
ones. 
Table 6.a - Do you do any paid or unpaid overtime work?  
Type of contract Paid and unpaid overtime work 
Permanent Temporary
Total 
Paid overtime 46.2% 37.3% 45.3% 
Unpaid overtime 10.6% 8.5% 10.4% 
  
Males and females 
  No overtime 43.2% 54.3% 44.2% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Pearson chi2(1)=32.2832   Pr = 0.000
Paid overtime 51.7% 47.1% 51.4% 
Unpaid overtime 9.5% 8.9% 9.4% 
 
Males 
 No overtime 38.8% 43.9% 39.2% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Pearson chi2(1) =   3.5220   Pr = 0.061
Paid overtime 38.2% 28.6% 37.1% 
Unpaid overtime 12.2% 8.1% 11.8% 
 
Females 
 No overtime 49.5% 63.4% 51.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Pearson chi2(1) =  27.0227   Pr = 0.000  
Source: elaborations on Isfol Plus data 
 
Table 6.b - Is your job organized on rotating shifts? 
Type of contract Total  
Permanent Temporary  
Yes 31.5% 29.1% 31.3%  Males and females 
No 68.5% 70.9% 68.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Pearson chi2(1) =   5.2580   Pr = 0.022
Yes 32.2% 30.4% 32.1% Males 
No 67.8% 69.6% 67.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Pearson chi2(1) =   0.3963   Pr = 0.529
Yes 30.5% 27.9% 30.2% Females 
No 69.5% 72.1% 69.8% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Pearson chi2(1) =   6.1789   Pr = 0.013
Source: elaborations on Isfol Plus data 
 
Table 6.c – Do you do night shifts (between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.)? 
Type of contract Total   
Permanent Temporary  
Yes, regularly 8.8% 5.5% 8.5% 
Yes, occasionally 9.1% 7.0% 8.9% 
 
Males and females 
  No, never 82.1% 87.6% 82.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Pearson chi2(2) =  11.0233   Pr = 0.004
Yes, regularly 10.9% 8.1% 10.7% 
Yes, occasionally 12.8% 10.9% 12.7% 
 
Males 
 No, never 76.3% 80.9% 76.6% 
Total 100.0% 1090.0% 100.0% 
Pearson chi2(2) =   5.1163   Pr = 0.077
Yes, regularly 5.7% 3.1% 5.4% 
Yes, occasionally 3.9% 3.5% 3.8% 
 
Females 
No, never 90.4% 93.4% 90.8% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Pearson chi2(2) =   0.8024   Pr = 0.670
Source: elaborations on Isfol Plus data 
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On the contrary, temporary workers are more likely to work on statutory 
holidays and weekends then stable workers (see table 6.d). Then I choose the latter 
effort indicator and  estimate the following probit model: 
 
iii XP εβα ++=       where:                =iP   ∫ workholiday     of  case  in  1 otherwise   0                      [1] 
on a sample of temporary and permanent workers.  
 
Table 6.d - Do you work during statutory holidays and/or weekends ? 
Type of contract Total   
Permanent Temporary   
Yes, regularly 26.1% 31.8% 26.6% 
Yes, occasionally 22.8% 21.1% 22.6% 
 
Males and females 
No, never 51.2% 47.0% 50.8% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Pearson chi2(2) =  26.8664   Pr = 0.000
Yes, regularly 25.5% 31.7% 25.9% 
Yes, occasionally 28.0% 24.5% 27.8% 
 
Males 
No, never 46.5% 43.8% 46.3% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Pearson chi2(2) =   15.5835   Pr = 0.000
Yes, regularly 26.9% 32.0% 27.5% 
Yes, occasionally 15.3% 18.1% 15.6% 
 
Females 
No, never 57.8% 49.9% 56.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Pearson chi2(2) =  31.2710   Pr = 0.000
Source: elaborations on Isfol Plus data 
 
 As well known, the estimated coefficients of the model are not directly 
comparable (W.H. Greene, 2003). For this reason it has been decided to transform 
them in “marginal effects” calculated at the sample mean of the variables. The 
marginal effects calculated for the binary variables refer to the discrete variation of 
the dummy variables from 0 to 1. 
The results of the estimates, reported in table 7, show that young people, female 
workers (with children aged 0-12), workers with at least a secondary level of 
education (if they are not overeducated), people working in small and medium 
firms and in the manufacturing sector, as well as workers not involved in training 
activity, exhibit a significantly lower probability of working on holidays. On the 
contrary southern workers and people employed in unskilled  professions are more 
likely to be involved with holiday work11. 
As noted above (table 6.d), temporary workers show a significantly higher 
probability of working on holiday and during the weekends than permanent ones. 
To shed light on the effort motivation of temporary workers, I  re-estimated the 
model on temporary workers only, considering among the regressors the subjective 
assessment of the probability of converting the current temporary job into a 
permanent one (table 8). 
 
                                                 
11 . In the sample there are no workers in the public sector who work on holydays and weekends. 
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Table 7 – Probit model with marginal effects: temporary and permanent 
workers 
 
Probit regression                             Number of obs   =  6562 
                                                        LR chi2(22)        =   
441.32 
                                                        Prob > chi2        =   
0.0000 
Log likelihood = -4301.3941            Pseudo R2        =   
0.0488 
Marginal effects after probit 
y  = Pr(P_holiday) (predict) =  
0.45303931 
 
Variables Coef. Dy/dx z P>|z| 
Age -0.03621 -0.01434 -2.94 0.003 
Age squared 0.000384 0.000152 2.51 0.012 
Female -0.11949 -0.04731 -2.90 0.004 
Married -0.06941 -0.02749 -1.69 0.091 
Family head 0.072257 0.028652 1.52 0.129 
South 0.214136 0.085063 5.89 0.000 
Bad Health 0.064778 0.025741 0.52 0.604 
Secondary Education -0.19344 -0.07666 -4.63 0.000 
Tertiary Education -0.46043 -0.1753 -8.04 0.000 
Small and medium firms -0.31527 -0.12525 -5.65 0.000 
Specific Experience 0.004783 0.001895 1.93 0.053 
Manufacturing Industries -0.32471 -0.12642 -8.55 0.000 
Unskilled professions 0.238666 0.094987 2.50 0.012 
Not overskilled 0.250877 0.099391 7.20 0.000 
No training -0.10619 -0.04211 -3.00 0.003 
Satisfied about working conditions -0.27114 -0.10771 -7.32 0.000 
Log(hourly wage) 0.073133 0.028974 1.52 0.128 
Temporary work 0.136621 0.054318 2.93 0.003 
Part time contract -0.03344 -0.01323 -0.73 0.467 
Children 0-12 -0.09713 -0.03859 -2.20 0.028 
High Marks 0.00086 0.000341 0.03 0.98 
Regular educational path -0.02282 -0.00905 -0.59 0.554 
Constant -8.53453  -1.72 0.086 
Source: elaborations on Isfol-Plus data 
 
 The marginal effect of this dummy variable  is monotonically increasing along 
with the improvement of the subjective expectation of becoming a permanent 
worker. Moreover, temporary workers characterised by a “high” subjective 
expectation of converting their contract into a stable one exhibit a significantly 
higher “effort” than temporary workers who consider it “impossible” to get a stable 
job12. 
 As a conclusion, in this section I have sought to quantify the impact of contract 
status on two different effort indicators (propensity to overwork and holiday work) 
using two different data sources and two different econometric techniques. The 
main finding of my empirical analysis appears to be robust to changes in sample 
and specifications. Indeed, in both cases, temporary workers seems to be more 
likely to perform through higher levels of effort if, and only if, they believe in 
having a good probability of converting their contract into a permanent one.  
                                                 
12 . Note that, when I estimate a model on an overall sample (with both permanent and temporary 
workers), including among the regressors the subjective assessment of the probability of 
converting the current temporary job into a permanent one, the dummy variable “temporary job” 
has been dropped due to collinearity. 
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Table 8 – Probit model with marginal effects: temporary workers only 
 
Probit regression                              Number of obs   =  1114 
                                                       LR chi2(24)        =  
162.08 
                                                       Prob > chi2        =   
0.0000 
Log likelihood = -688.79879              Pseudo R2      =   
0.1053 
Marginal effects after probit 
y  = Pr(P_holiday) (predict) =  
0.53445827 
 
Variables Coef. dy/dx z P>|z| 
Age -0.01387 -0.00551 -0.43 0.668 
Age squared -6.46E-06 -2.57E-06 -0.01 0.988 
Female 0.022968 0.00913 0.25 0.802 
Married -0.0271 -0.01078 -0.21 0.832 
Family head 0.024445 0.009708 0.17 0.863 
South 0.334317 0.131407 3.90 0.000 
Bad Health 0.095579 0.037779 0.23 0.821 
Secondary Education -0.05916 -0.0235 -0.53 0.599 
Tertiary Education -0.54409 -0.21377 -3.57 0.000 
Small and medium firms -0.47547 -0.17976 -2.68 0.007 
Specific Experience -0.01169 -0.00465 -1.02 0.307 
Manufacturing Industries -0.71106 -0.27464 -6.65 0.000 
Unskilled professions 0.288958 0.112199 1.44 0.15 
Not overskilled 0.449206 0.178538 5.22 0.000 
No training -0.09107 -0.03614 -1.04 0.297 
Satisfied about working conditions -0.28228 -0.11075 -2.93 0.003 
log(hourly wage) 0.193988 0.077101 1.78 0.075 
Subjective expectation (impossible)  
Low 0.0583 0.023144 0.54 0.59 
Sufficiently high  0.218343 0.086172 1.98 0.048 
High 0.318399 0.124226 2.48 0.013 
Part time contract -0.03376 -0.01343 -0.33 0.744 
Children 0-12 -0.19549 -0.07684 -1.33 0.183 
High Marks 0.034635 0.013764 0.41 0.684 
Regular educational path -0.02466 -0.00979 -0.25 0.8 
Constant 23.74238 1.03 0.302 
Source: elaborations on Isfol-Plus data 
 
  17
4. Effort and productivity 
 
Showing that temporary workers display, for a variety of reasons, higher levels 
of effort than permanent employees, is not sufficient to conclude in favour of the 
incentive effects of temporary contracts. It would also be necessary to show that 
such an effort is not only a temporary one, and can produce higher productivity 
from different points of view.  
The concept of productivity, indeed, may be defined in different ways (see the 
discussion introduced by Levitan and Werneke, 1984, pp. 3-4).  
From the worker’s point of view, productivity can be defined as the “effort” 
made in the production processes during a given period of time. From the 
manager’s point of view, productivity may be defined in terms of quantity of 
production obtained by a labour unit in a given period of time. From the 
entrepreneur’s point of view, productivity can be defined in terms of profits 
obtained during a given period of time. From the consumer’s point of view, 
productivity can be defined in terms of the quality and prices of goods and 
services. 
It is clearly pointed out by the econometric analysis carried out in this paper 
that, under certain conditions, workers are induced to a higher “effort” if they are 
employed on a temporary basis, i.e. they supply more (paid or unpaid) working 
hours, or they are more inclined to work on holidays or during the weekends.  
However, on the one hand, this does not imply that they exploit working time 
more intensively. In other words, a higher “effort” does not necessarily mean a 
higher quantity of production by unit of labour input. In this case the higher effort 
of temporary workers does not help in understanding the impact of temporary 
employment on labour productivity from the managers and entrepreneurs’ point of 
view, which remain unclear and to be demonstrated13. On the contrary we could 
assume that a unit of labour performed by a temporary worker risks producing a 
lower result than a unit of labour performed by a permanent worker with a long 
experience in the productive process. 
On the other hand, even if a harder effort would automatically imply a higher 
level of productivity (from the point of view of the manager and the entrepreneur), 
if the higher effort of temporary workers were performed to improve the 
probability of transforming temporary work into permanent work within a 
reasonable period of time, being unsuccessful in this aim could discourage 
workers, leading towards a reduction of such an effort. In other words, if we accept 
the hypothesis that the higher effort of temporary workers depends on expected 
opportunities of getting a permanent contract, we have to conclude that such an 
effort would decrease/disappear if expectations worsen.  
For these reasons, temporary workers’ higher effort could produce positive 
effects on labour productivity only in the short-run (if any), and negative ones in a 
longer period of time, because of the discouraging consequences of employment 
precariousness on workers’ behaviour. 
                                                 
13 . It was observed (see Levitan, Werneke, 1984, p. 4) that “if a worker’s effort was a satisfactory 
indicator of labour productivity, the Egyptian Pyramids would be the most productive 
organizational structure in man’s experience”. 
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 In this case, if the current increase of temporary employment were perceived as 
an increase in precariousness, the effects of temporary contracts on the workers’ 
effort and labour productivity would be temporary and uncertain.  
Moreover, researches carried out in the United Kingdom and USA (Taylor, 
2003), on the one hand, reinforce the importance of internal labour flexibility 
(flexible organizational arrangements and new management techniques) to promote 
innovation and competitiveness, but, on the other hand, show that the external 
labour flexibility (atypical labour contracts and lighter regulation framework) risks 
to create contingent workers with temporary contracts not compatible with the 
creation of workplaces that enhance performance and labour productivity, in the 
sense of quantity and quality of goods and services produced by a unit of labour 
input. These researches point out that the abuse of temporary workers risks to 
create a barrier to competitiveness, because higher performance workplaces are 
based on the creation of stable and better-motivated workforces, in a fully 
integrated working environment that promotes skills and innovation. Indeed, 
temporary labour contracts provide, in general, less human capital accumulation 
than permanent ones (Albert, Garcìa-Serrano, Hernanz, 2005; Arulampalan, Booth, 
1998). This lack of human capital accumulation involves both non formal and 
informal learning: on the one hand, enterprises are not motivated to invest in 
training because the tenure of the contract is not long enough to guarantee an 
adequate return of investment; on the other hand, the short tenure of the contract 
provides a lower level of informal learning acquired on-the-job rather than that 
connected to a permanent job. In this context (as asserted by Dornbusch, Fischer 
and Samuelson, 1977), it could be better to reply to globalisation exploiting a 
comparative advantage founded on a knowledge-based economic activity. 
In general, microeconomic researches carried out in Italy show that some 
aspects of labour flexibility can have positive effects on innovations and labour 
productivity (see Zanetti, 2000). However, if the labour flexibility is accompanied 
by employment precariousness, the long-term effects on labour productivity seem 
to be normally negative (Frey, Croce, eds., 2002; Frey, Pappadà, eds., 2004).  
In this framework, the Eurostat data show an apparently negative relationship 
between the incidence of temporary work on total employment and the trend of 
labour productivity per man/hour. In particular, data reported in table 9 and in  
table 10 suggest that in European countries we can find very different types of 
experiences. 
The Spanish experience presents the maximum incidence of temporary work 
over the last ten years. However Spain has recently tried to overcome job 
precariousness by law, introducing a rule that prevents firms from filling the same 
vacancy for more than 3 years with one, or several, temporary workers (Güell, 
Petrongolo, 2003). The French experience is similar to the Spanish one in terms of 
incidence of temporary employment and attitude of labour policies, because 
recently, it has re-considered the economic and social consequences of temporary 
work and cancelled new forms of temporary contracts under the pressure of trade 
unions and workers’ mobilization. 
Both experiences show a decreasing incidence of temporary employment (on 
total employment) and erratic productivity per hour worked over the last few years. 
The British and German experiences show better productivity performances in 
the years in which the incidence of temporary employment was much less than the 
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average in the EU. In any case the British experience shows much more voluntary 
part-time work than temporary work, probably with less negative consequences for 
the workers involved, and in Germany temporary work is mainly concentrated 
within the apprenticeship system and it appears to be a step towards less precarious 
forms of employment. 
 
Table 9 – Productivity per hour worked in some European Countries, from 
1995 to 2003 (annual percentage growth) 
Countries 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
European Union 15 2.0 1.2 1.7 1.5 1.6 2.5 1.0 0.6 0.8 
Denmark 4.4 1.9 1.3 1 -1.3 4.9 0.5 2.5  
Germany  2.5 2.3 2 1.3 1.5 2.2 1.4 1.3 0.8 
Spain  0.9 1.4 0.9 -0.7 1.7 0.8 0.4 1.1  
France 2.3 0.4 1.9 2.6 1.6 4.4 1.8 0.3 2.8 
Ireland 5.7 4.2 7.7 4.2 6.8 5.3 3.9 6.1  
Italy 3 0.3 1.5 0.9 0.9 1.3 0.5 -1.4  
Netherlands 2.3 0.1 1.1 2.9 2.7 -0.5 2.7 -1.6  
Austria 1.6 2.6 -1.9 9.1 0.6     
Portugal 3 3.1 4.6 2.8 1.1 3.7    
Finland 1.5 2 3.3 3.1 0.7 3.2 0.4 1.9 0.9 
Sweden 2.1 1.6 3.5 2.2 1.8 3.3 0.4 3.3 3 
United Kingdom 1.8 1.2 1.5 2.2 2 3.1 1.2 1.2  
Source: European Commission, Employment in Europe 2004, pp. 229 and f., Office of Official 
Publication, Luxembourg, August 2004. 
 
Table 10 – Incidence of fixed-term employment on total employment in some 
European Countries, from 1995 to 2003 (percentages) 
Countries 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
European Union 15 12.0 12.3 12.7 13.1 13.4 13.6 13.3 13.0 12.8 
Denmark 11.6 10.9 10.6 9.9 9.6 9.7 9.2 9.1 9.3 
Germany  10.5 11.2 11.8 12.4 13 12.7 12.4 12.1 12.2 
Spain  35.2 34.1 33.8 33.2 32.9 32 31.7 31 30.6 
France 12.4 12.8 13.4 13.9 14.5 15.2 14.6 13.5 12.9 
Ireland 10 9.3 9 7.2 5.2 5.7 5.2 5.3 5.1 
Italy 7.4 7.4 7.9 8.6 9.5 10.1 9.8 9.9 9.9 
Netherlands 11.4 12.3 11.8 13 12.3 13.7 14.3 14.4 14.6 
Austria 6.8 7.8 7.9 7.8 7.9 8 7.8 7.3 7.1 
Portugal 12 13.6 15.4 17.2 18.7 19.9 20.4 21.7 21.1 
Finland 11.6 11.4 10.9 11.4 12.1 12.3 12.2 12.8 13 
Sweden 14.7 14.4 15.1 16.1 16.5 15.8 15.2 15.2 15.1 
United Kingdom 7.2 7.3 7.6 7.3 7 6.9 6.7 6.3 6.1 
Source: European Commission, DG5, Employment in Europe, 2003-2004, Statistical annexes, 
Luxembourg, European Community Office for the Publications. 
 
The Italian experience shows a relatively high and growing incidence of 
temporary employment, with prevalent negative consequences for the workers 
involved, and a very negative performance of productivity per hour worked over 
the last ten years. 
Moreover, the Irish case shows the highest percentage growth of productivity 
per hour worked in the EU15 and a strong decrease in the incidence of fixed-term 
contracts. In 2003 Ireland was characterised by the lowest percentage of temporary 
work on total employment in the EU15. On the contrary, Scandinavian countries 
seem to conjugate a relatively high and globally stable quota of fixed-term 
contracts with an acceptable evolution of productivity. In this context, the case of 
the Netherlands represents a remarkable exception. Dutch labour markets, in fact, 
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have been characterised by a negative evolution of productivity and by an increase 
in temporary employment. 
Considering all this information, we cannot exclude that active labour policies, 
contributing to a reduction of the incidence of temporary employment, can 
positively affect the working and living conditions of Italian employees and the 
productivity performances of the Italian economic system, at least in the long run. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The global approach of this paper is based on the assumption that temporary 
workers are interested in making a higher effort than permanent workers only if 
they perceive that this effort may provide a “stepping stone” towards typical labour 
contracts.  
The empirical test of such a hypothesis was based on the European Community 
Household Panel and on the Isfol-Plus data. In particular, in the case of ECHP data, 
in which there is no information about the subjective assessment of the probability 
of converting the current temporary job into a permanent one, I assumed that the 
proportion of temporary contracts in the region where the worker lives can be 
considered an easily observable indicator of such a probability. The lower the 
proportion of temporary workers in the region, the higher would be the subjective 
probability perceived by temporary workers of gaining permanency, and the higher 
would be the effort of such workers.  
The statistical and econometric tests presented in the third section support the 
hypothesis that a higher proportion of temporary employees at regional level, or in 
any case, a bad subjective expectation about the probability of getting a stable 
contract, discourages atypical workers from producing a high level of effort.  
Anyhow, we can not rule out the possibility that temporary  workers’ higher 
efforts  do not last in the medium-long term. Indeed, on the one hand, if they 
perceive a low probability of transforming their contracts into permanent ones, they 
would reduce their level of effort and, on the other hand, we can not exclude that 
ex-temporary workers would not have the incentive to operate with a high level of 
effort after being confirmed on a stable basis (Engellandt, Riphahn, 2005). In the 
latter situation it would be more convenient for firms to keep the quota of 
temporary workers constant over time, in an attempt to gain the workers’ higher 
levels of effort. This way, however, firms could signal a low probability of access 
to permanent jobs for temporary workers, with negative results in terms of effort14.  
Moreover, the eventually higher effort, in terms of working hours, given by 
temporary workers, does not necessarily mean higher labour productivity. The 
European data discussed in the fourth section, indeed, show an apparently negative 
relationship between the incidence of temporary work on total employment and the 
trend of labour productivity per man/hour.  In particular, the Italian experience 
presents a growing incidence of temporary employment, along with worse 
productivity performance, in terms of productivity per man/hour, than countries 
with a decreasing incidence of temporary employment. 
                                                 
14 . In the Italian institutional context it is not even believable that a high stock of temporary workers 
would operate as a modern “industrial reserve army”, which would be a deterrent for the effort of 
permanent employees. 
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Considering the information collected and discussed in this paper, we can argue 
that policies directed to contain/reduce the incidence of temporary contracts on 
total employment could have positive effects on (long run) labour productivity, in 
addition to better working and living conditions for the workers involved and their 
families. 
The Danish and Dutch experiences can provide useful suggestions about which 
kind of policies can be pursued, mainly in the direction of flex-security of 
employment.  
Policy makers should focus more on high-skill solutions than on short-term 
contracts, stimulating firms to consider this approach. This way they would launch 
the approach “skills and innovation”15, in a production system that is still anchored 
to low-skill methods, and would reduce the risk of vicious circles based on low-
value added and low-skills, leading towards a “low skill, bad job trap” (Snower, 
1996). 
In Scandinavian countries, industrial and employment policies are integrated 
(Taylor, 2003), providing high performance workplaces. Even if it is not easy to 
adapt such policies in a country like Italy, which is very different from the 
Scandinavian socio-economic system, it would be important to implement an 
integrated package of policies aiming to innovate (new technologies, new 
organizational methods, new products), create a high-skill workplace (opportunity 
of lifelong learning for all, that is, education, training and informal learning for 
everyone at any age) and create a high quality of working conditions and working 
life. This recipe might probably improve the 21st century globalized labour market.   
                                                 
15 A process of integration between skills and innovation production. An organization can not produce 
innovation without producing skills and vice-versa. 
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Appendix A  - Eurostat data and variables description 
 
 The data used for the estimations presented in section 3.1 are obtained from the 3rd to 8th waves 
(1996-2001) of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP-Eurostat) for the case of Italy. For 
the purpose of this analysis the individuals included in the sample have been selected so as to include 
employed people, with a permanent contract, with a temporary contract or without any contract 
(29,486 observations). 
In the ECHP survey the main question on “precariousness” is PE0024 (applicable only for 
dependent employment): “What type of employment contract do you have in your main job?” 
Respondents are asked to select the type of contract among the following categories: Permanent 
employment; Fixed-term or short term contract; Casual work with no contract; Some other working 
arrangement.In this case we could consider category 2 and category 3 “temporary/precarious jobs”, 
(category 4 includes only few observations and I dropped them from the analysis).  
 Some of the variables included in the estimates are described below. 
 
Table A1 – Sample means for the set of regressors 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Probability of overwork 29486 0.573086 0.494638 0 1 
1996 29486 0.1875 0.390312 0 1 
1997 29486 0.173 0.378247 0 1 
1998 29486 0.169 0.374752 0 1 
1999 29476 0.1646 0.370819 0 1 
2000 29486 0.158 0.364741 0 1 
2001 29476 0.1478 0.354902 0 1 
Age 29486 38.75076 10.55622 15 64 
Age squared 29486 1613.052 852.1881 225 4096 
Females 29486 0.395679 0.489004 0 1 
Married 29476 0.676822 0.467698 0 1 
South 29239 0.401211 0.490152 0 1 
Bad Health 29457 0.029059 0.167976 0 1 
Secondary Education 29197 0.467925 0.498979 0 1 
Tertiary Education 29197 0.41083 0.491993 0 1 
Small and medium firm 26639 0.359135 0.479756 0 1 
Specific Experience 26429 10.06818 7.497709 0 22 
Manufacturing Industries 29486 0.233569 0.423108 0 1 
Elementary occupations 29486 0.102015 0.302673 0 1 
Public sector 28412 0.367978 0.482264 0 1 
Not overskilled 28381 0.516508 0.499736 0 1 
Not specific training 29472 0.650075 0.476954 0 1 
Satisfied about working hours 29371 0.681114 0.466053 0 1 
Hours spent for children care 9840 26.85528 16.74557 1 70 
log(hourly wage) 28871 1.045119 0.16685 0.31607 1.953839 
Temporary work 29486 0.133012 0.339594 0 1 
% of temporary contracts 29486 9.620383 4.381988 3.9 20.4 
Unemployed before, yes/not 18541 1.463999 0.498716 1 2 
Number of periods of unemployment 29486 2.25144 4.638551 0 96 
Part-time contracts 29486 0.806756 1.576503 1 2 
 
Probability of overwork (dependent variable): binary variable built on questions PE005 (Total 
number of hours worked per week) and PE005C (Full time/part time contract). This variable is equal 
to 1 if the individual works more than 40 hours a week (with a full time contract) or more than 20 
hours a week (with a part-time contract); otherwise the variable is equal to 0. 
Specific Experience: variable built on the basis of the question PE011 as follows: 
job current of year   starting- survey  the of year   experience  Specific =  
Elementary occupation: dummy variable built on question PE006c (Occupation in current job, i.e. 
principal activity performed), Elementary occupations = 1; others = 0 (legislators, senior officials and 
managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals, clerks, service workers and shop and 
market sales workers, skilled agricultural and fishery workers, craft and related trades workers, plant 
and machine operators and assemblers, armed forces). 
Not overskilled: dummy variable built on question PE016 (Do you feel that you have skills or 
qualifications to do a more demanding job than the one you have now?); no=1, yes=0. 
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Not specific training: dummy variable built on question PE021 (Have you had formal training or 
education that has given you skills needed for your present type of work?); no=1, yes=0. 
Satisfied about working hours: dummy variable built on question PE034 (How satisfied are you 
with your present job in terms of number of working hours?), 1 = not satisfied….. 6 = fully satisfied;  
1,2,3 = 0;  4,5,6 = 1. 
Log(hourly wage): variable built on the basis of question PI211M (Current wage and salary 
earnings, net-monthly) and of question PE005 (Total number of hours worked per week). This 
information has also been utilised for the definition of “overtime” work. 
% of temporary contracts: percentage of temporary contracts over the total dependent employment 
by year, gender and Eurostat region; CNEL elaborations on ISTAT data. 
 
Appendix B  - Isfol-PLUS data and variables description 
 
The data used for the estimations of section 3.2 are drawn from Isfol-PLUS, 2005. This survey 
contains information on the characteristic of 40,386 individuals, selected according to their status of 
participation to the labour market. The operational sample includes only dependent employees with a 
permanent or a temporary contract (13,891 individuals).The dependent variable is the probability of 
holiday work.  
Concerning the definition of the variables, see description below. 
 
Table B1- Sample means for the set of regressors 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
P_holyday 12736 0.482412 0.49971 0 1 
Age 13891 39.39608 12.52159 15 64 
Age squared 13891 1708.83 1007.731 225 4096 
Female 13891 0.534303 0.49884 0 1 
Married 13891 0.565906 0.495655 0 1 
Head of family 13891 0.416241 0.492952 0 1 
South 13891 0.333525 0.471489 0 1 
Bad health 13891 0.020805 0.142736 0 1 
Secondary education 13891 0.540422 0.498381 0 1 
Tertiary education 13891 0.257289 0.437156 0 1 
Little and medium firms 8404 0.916825 0.276163 0 1 
Specific experience 13891 12.139 11.17229 0 50 
Manufacturing indistries 13891 0.144914 0.352027 0 1 
Not qualified professions 13891 0.030595 0.172225 0 1 
Not overskilled 13891 0.42128 0.493782 0 1 
No training 13891 0.521777 0.499544 0 1 
Satisfied about working conditions 13751 0.747 0.434747 0 1 
Log (hourly wage) 12736 1.949799 0.395688 0.29 4.39 
Temporary contract 13891 0.224174 0.417052 0 1 
Subjective expectation about the probability of convertion:  
High 2585 0.171 0.376509 0 1 
Sufficiently high 2585 0.2538 0.435185 0 1 
Low 2585 0.3327 0.47118 0 1 
Impossiblempossibile 2585 0.2426 0.428655 0 1 
Part time contract 12736 0.156564 0.363404 0 1 
Children 0-12 13891 0.790152 0.407215 0 1 
High Marks 12370 0.554083 0.497087 0 1 
Regular educational path 13530 0.766962 0.422782 0 1 
 
Probability of working on holidays/weekends (dependent variable): binary variable which takes 
value 1 if the answer to question V570 is “yes” and value 0 otherwise. 
Specific Experience:  number of years of work within current job, built on the basis of question 
V460_1 as follows: 
job  current  of  year    starting-  2005     experience  Specific =  
Unskilled professions: dummy variable built on question PROF9 (Profession), Unskilled professions 
= 1; others = 0 (legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, technicians, clerks, qualified 
workers in service and sales sectors, craftsmen, skilled workers and agricultural workers, plant and 
machine operators and assemblers, armed forces). 
  24
Not overskilled: dummy variable built on question VF430_1 (Is your educational level necessary to 
do your current job?); yes=1; no=0. 
No training: dummy variable built on question V1750 (Have you been involved in training or 
education during the last 3 years?); no = 1, yes =0. 
Log(hourly wage): variable built on the basis of question V658 (net-monthly wage) and of question 
V230_1 – V230_3 (Working hour).  
Temporary contract: dummy variable built on question V110_2 (What type of employment contract 
do you have in your current job?); temporary =1, permanent=0. 
Subjective expectation: dummy variables built on questions V280, V340, V380 (How do you feel 
about the probability of converting your current temporary contract into a permanent one?); high=1, 
sufficiently high=2, low=3, impossible=4 (ref. category). 
High Marks: dummy variable built on question V890 (lower secondary education; medium-high =1, 
medium-low = 0); on question V892 (upper secondary education; from 60/60 to 48/60, or from 
100/100 to 80/100, = 1, from 47/60 to 36/60, or from 79/100 to 60/100, = 0); and on question V898 
(tertiary education; from 100 cum laude to 99 = 1, from 98 to 66 = 0). 
Regular educational path: dummy variable built on question V910 (tertiary education; tertiary 
education degree “in corso” or “fuori corso” within 3 years = 1; “fuori corso” longer than 3 years = 
0); and on question V920 (lower and upper secondary education; no failure = 1;  one, two or more 
failures = 0). 
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